This article studies the design of medium access control (MAC) protocols for wireless networks that are provably robust against arbitrary and unpredictable disruptions (e.g., due to unintentional external interference from co-existing networks or due to jamming). We consider a wireless network consisting of a set of n honest and reliable nodes within transmission (and interference) range of each other, and we model the external disruptions with a powerful adaptive adversary. This adversary may know the protocol and its entire history and can use this knowledge to jam the wireless channel at will at any time. It is allowed to jam a (1 − )-fraction of the timesteps, for an arbitrary constant > 0 unknown to the nodes. The nodes cannot distinguish between the adversarial jamming or a collision of two or more messages that are sent at the same time. We demonstrate, for the first time, that there is a local-control MAC protocol requiring only very limited knowledge about the adversary and the network that achieves a constant (asymptotically optimal) throughput for the nonjammed time periods under any of the aforementioned adversarial strategies. The derived principles are also useful to build robust applications on top of the MAC layer, and we present an exemplary study for leader election, one of the most fundamental tasks in distributed computing.
INTRODUCTION
The efficient use of a shared medium is arguably not only one of the most relevant but also one of the most complex problems in distributed computing. First, a wireless network requires distributed access coordination mechanisms that minimize the internal interference due to simultaneous transmissions from wireless devices in the same network. In addition, the availability of the wireless medium can vary significantly over time due to the external interference, for example, due to disturbances from other sources such as microwaves, due to transmissions of coexisting (potentially mobile) networks, or due to intentional or even adversarial interruptions. Adversarial attacks constitute a major threat, especially because they often do not require any special hardware and may be implemented by simply listening to the open medium and broadcasting in the same frequency band as the network.
This article studies the design of distributed medium access schemes that are robust even against a powerful adversary who can block the medium at arbitrary and unpredictable times and in an adaptive manner (i.e., depending on the protocol history). This adversarial model is used to capture a wide range of interference scenarios. Despite the adversary's power, we show that provably robust medium access solutions exist in the sense that in the time periods where the medium is available, there are many successful transmissions.
Our Model
We attend to a wireless network consisting of n reliable and honest nodes within each other's transmission (and interference) range. All of the nodes are continuously contending for sending a packet on the wireless channel. We assume that time proceeds in synchronous timesteps and in each timestep any node may decide to transmit a packet. A node may either transmit a message or sense the channel at a timestep, but it cannot do both, and there is no immediate feedback mechanism telling a node whether its transmission was successful. A node that is sensing the channel may either (1) sense an idle channel (in case no other node is transmitting at that time), (2) sense a busy channel (in case two or more nodes transmit at the timestep), or (3) receive a packet (in case exactly one node transmits at the timestep).
In addition to these nodes, there is an adversary. We allow the adversary to know the protocol and its entire history and to use this knowledge in order to jam the wireless channel at will at any time (i.e, the adversary is adaptive). Whenever it jams the channel, all nodes will notice a busy channel. However, the nodes cannot distinguish between the adversarial jamming or a collision of two or more messages that are sent at the same time. We assume that the adversary is only allowed to jam a (1− )-fraction of the time steps, for an arbitrary constant > 0 unknown to the honest nodes.
We allow the adversary to perform bursty jamming. More formally, an adversary is called (T , 1 − )-bounded for some T ∈ N and 0 < < 1 if for any time window of size w ≥ T the adversary can jam at most (1 − )w of the timesteps in that window. A MAC protocol is called c-competitive against some (T , 1 − )-bounded adversary (with high probability 1 or on expectation) if, for any sufficiently large number of timesteps, the nodes manage to perform successful message transmissions in at least a c-fraction of the timesteps not jammed by the adversary (with high probability or on expectation).
Our goal is to design a symmetric local-control MAC protocol that is constant competitive against any (T , 1 − )-bounded adversary, that is, there is no central authority controlling the nodes, and the nodes have symmetric roles at any point in time. The nodes do not know , but we do allow them to have a very rough upper bound of their number n and T . More specifically, we will assume that the nodes have a common parameter γ = O(1/(log T + log log n)). Such an estimate leaves room for a superpolynomial change in n and a polynomial change in T over time, so it does not make the problem trivial (as it would be the case if the nodes knew constant factor approximations of n or T ).
Our Contributions
This article introduces techniques for the design of robust medium access protocols. In particular, it presents the first MAC protocol that is constant competitive w.h.p., under any (T , 1 − )-bounded adversary, given that the protocol is executed for a sufficiently long time. The protocol does not need to know , and can be an arbitrarily small constant. The developed principles can also be used to build robust applications on top of the MAC layer. In this respect, we present a new solution to the leader election problem-an evergreen in the distributed computing. Our solution is not only robust to interference, but it is also self-stabilizing in the sense that it converges to a correct state from any initial state. This is particularly interesting in dynamic environments. We are not aware of any similarly robust solution to the leader election problem.
Related Work
Wireless network jamming has been extensively studied in the applied networking domain [Alnifie and Simon 2007; Brown et al. 2006; Chiang and Hu 2007; Law et al. 2005; Li et al. 2007; Liu et al. 2007; Navda et al. 2007; Negi and Perrig 2003; Thuente and Acharya 2006; Wood et al. 2007; Xu et al. 2005 Xu et al. , 2006 . Mechanisms for launching jamming attacks [Chiang and Hu 2007; Law et al. 2005; Li et al. 2007; Xu et al. 2005] as well as defense mechanisms against these attacks [Alnifie and Simon 2007; Chiang and Hu 2007; Wood et al. 2007; Li et al. 2007; Liu et al. 2007; Navda et al. 2007; Brown et al. 2006; Xu et al. 2005] have been proposed and validated through simulations and experiments.
Traditional defenses against jamming primarily focus on the design of physical layer technologies, such as spread spectrum [Liu et al. 2007; Navda et al. 2007; Simon et al. 2001] . Although widely spread frequencies could potentially help in guarding against physical layer jamming, spread spectrum techniques cannot be used effectively in the relatively narrow frequency bands used by the 802.11 standard.
More recent work has also focused on various MAC layer strategies in order to handle jamming, including coding strategies [Chiang and Hu 2007] , channel surfing and spatial retreat [Xu et al. 2004; Alnifie and Simon 2007] , or mechanisms to hide messages from a jammer, evade its search, and reduce the impact of corrupted messages [Wood et al. 2007 ]. Most of these strategies have only been evaluated experimentally and would not help against the jammers considered in this article.
The study by Bayraktaroglu et al. [2008] shows both theoretically and experimentally that an adaptive jammer, such as the one proposed here, can dramatically reduce the throughput of the standard random backoff MAC protocol of the IEEE 802.11 standard with only limited energy cost on the adversary side (please also refer to Bayraktaroglu et al. [2008] for other references on jamming in 802.11).
Adversarial jamming has also been studied theoretically. There are two basic approaches in the literature. The first assumes that messages may be corrupted at random (e.g., Pelc and Peleg [2005] ), and the second bounds the number of messages that the adversary can transmit or disrupt due to, for example, a limited energy budget (e.g., Gilbert et al. [2006] and Koo et al. [2006] ). In a single hop wireless network (like ours), messages will not be corrupted independently at random (every time the jammer transmits, all messages in that timestep will be corrupted); moreover, an adaptive adversary seems more powerful than one that jams uniformly at random [Bayraktaroglu 24:4 B. Awerbuch et al. et al. 2008] . Hence, we focus on the second line of theoretical work because it is more relevant to the results in this article.
The results in Gilbert et al. [2006] and Koo et al. [2006] address adversarial jamming at both the MAC and network layers, where the adversary may not only be jamming the channel but also introducing malicious (fake) messages (possibly with address spoofing). The results in Gilbert et al. [2006] only consider the scenario that the nodes have one message to transmit (e.g., a broadcast operation). When translated to our continuous datastream scenario, the protocol presented in Gilbert et al. [2006] would not be able to sustain a constant-competitive ratio if the adversary is allowed to jam more than half of the timesteps (i.e., if < 1/2), given the fact that their single message broadcast algorithm takes at least twice as many steps as the number of timesteps utilized by the jammer. Moreover, Gilbert et al. [2006] assumes that the nodes have knowledge of n and of the fact that the adversary has a bounded number of messages it can transmit (in contrast, we only need the nodes to have an estimate on log log n and log T ). Koo et al. [2006] consider a wireless network in which node positions form a grid where multiple (at most t) adversarial nodes are allowed in the direct neighborhood of a node. If t is at most a suitably small constant, then they give a protocol for reliable broadcast of a single message given that there is a fixed bound on the number of timesteps the adversary is disrupting communication (if t is large, no broadcast protocol is guaranteed to terminate). The authors only show that eventually the broadcast operation will be completed, but they give no bounds on how long that will take. Moreover, their algorithms will clearly deplete the energy of the nonfaulty nodes at a higher rate than that of the faulty nodes.
Most of the theoretical work on the design of efficient MAC protocols has focused on random backoff protocols (e.g., Bender et al. [2005] , Chlebus et al. [2006] , Goldberg et al. [2000] , Hastad et al. [1996] , Kwak et al. [2005] , and Raghavan and Upfal [1999] ) that do not take jamming activity into account and, therefore, are not robust against it. MAC protocols have also been designed in the context of broadcasting (e.g., Czumaj and Rytter [2006] ) and clustering (e.g., Kuhn et al. [2004] ). Most of them use random backoff or tournaments to handle interference and thereby achieve a fast runtime.
In general terms, in a random backoff protocol, each node periodically attempts to transmit a message starting with a certain probability p. In case the message transmission is unsuccessful (due to interference), the node will retry sending the message in the next timesteps with monotonically decreasing probabilities (e.g., p 2 , p 4 , p 8 , . . .) until the message is successfully transmitted or the minimum allowable probability is reached. In a dense network (as in our single-hop scenario), an adversary with knowledge of the MAC protocol would simply wait until the nodes have reached transmission probabilities that are inversely proportional to the number of close-by nodes to start jamming the channel, forcing the nodes to lower their transmission probabilities by so much that a constant throughput is not achievable.
The multichannel medium access problem introduced in the theory community by Dolev et al. [2007b] and also studied in Dolev et al. [2007a Dolev et al. [ , 2007b Dolev et al. [ , 2008 Dolev et al. [ , 2009 , Gilbert et al. [2009a Gilbert et al. [ , 2009b , and Meier et al. [2009] , a node can only access one channel at a time, which results in protocols with a fairly large runtime (which can be exponential for deterministic protocols [Dolev et al. 2007a; Gilbert et al. 2009a] and at least quadratic in the number of jammed channels for randomized protocols [Dolev et al. 2008; Meier et al. 2009 ] if the adversary can jam almost all channels at a time). Recent work [Dolev et al. 2009 ] also focuses on the wireless synchronization problem which requires devices to be activated at different times on a congested single-hop radio network to synchronize their round numbering while an adversary can disrupt a certain number of frequencies per round. Gilbert et al. [2009b] study robust information exchange in single-hop networks.
Our model was first introduced in Awerbuch et al. [2008] , where the competitive throughput result is derived. Subsequently, the approach was successfully extended to reactive jamming environments [Richa et al. 2011] , multihop Unit Disk networks [Richa et al. 2010 ] and coexisting networks [Richa et al. 2012] .
There is also a large body on the leader election application considered in this article. Leader election is an evergreen in distributed algorithms research and there exist many theoretical and practical results [Awerbuch 1987; Gallager et al. 1983; Korach et al. 1990; Lee et al. 2007; Nakano and Olariu 2000; Nikano and Olariu 2002; Smaragdakis et al. 2004; Willard 1986 ]. The following two book chapters provide a good introduction: Chapter 3 in Attiya and Welch [2004] and Chapter 8 in Hromkovic et al. [2005] . A leader election algorithm should be as flexible as possible in the sense that a correct solution is computed independently of the initial network state. For instance, the algorithm should be able to react to a leader departure or be able to cope with situations where, for some reasons, multiple nodes consider themselves leaders. Self-stabilization [Dijkstra 1974 ] is an attractive concept to describe such self-repairing properties of an algorithm, and it has been intensively studied already, not only in terms of eventual stabilization but also in terms of guaranteed convergence times (see, e.g., the works on time-adaptive selfstabilization such as Kutten and Patt-Shamir [1997] ). Several self-stabilizing leader election protocols have been devised [Antonoiu et al. 1996; Cai et al. 2009; Itkis et al. 1995] (see also the fault-contained solutions such as Ghosh and Gupta [1996] ). However, none of these approaches allows us to elect a leader in a wireless network that is exposed to harsh interference or even adaptive jamming. But such interruptions of communication are often unavoidable in wireless systems, and we believe that electing a leader can be particularly useful in such harsh environments.
Organization
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main principles of our approach and presents the robust medium access protocol (Section 2.1). We prove competitive throughput in Section 2.2 and also show that the number of useless message transmission attempts in times of high external interference is small (i.e., the protocol does not waste transmission energy). Section 3 then attends to the specific application of leader election and presents a protocol (Section 3.1) together with a proof of the robustness properties (Section 3.2). Section 4 concludes the article.
ROBUST MEDIUM ACCESS
In this section, we present and analyze our MAC protocol. We start with a description of our basic ideas behind the protocol and then provide the formal listing of the protocol and analyze its competitiveness.
Our MAC protocol is based on a simple idea. Suppose that each node v decides to send a message at the current timestep with probability p v with p v ≤p for some small constant 0 <p < 1. Let p = v p v , q 0 be the probability that the channel is idle and q 1 be the probability that exactly one node is sending a message. Then, the following claim holds.
Hence, if the nodes observe that the number of timesteps in which the channel is idle is essentially equal to the number of timesteps in which exactly one message is sent, then p = v p v is likely to be around 1. Otherwise, they know that they need to adapt their probabilities. Therefore, if we had sufficiently many cases in which an idle channel or exactly one message transmission is observed (which is the case if the adversary does not heavily jam the channel and p is not too large), then one can adapt the probabilities p v just based on these two events and ignore all cases in which the wireless channel is blocked (either because the adversary is jamming it or at least two messages interfere with each other). Essentially, the following strategy could be used at every node for some small enough γ > 0:
In each timestep, every node v is sending a message with probability p v . If it decides not to send a message, it checks the following two cases:
-If the wireless channel is idle, then
The beauty of the algorithm is that it ignores blocked timesteps, which makes it more robust against adversarial jamming: the access probabilities are maintained. However, there is a catch to this strategy because it only works well as long as p does not get too high. If p is initially very high or by chance gets very high, it will be extremely unlikely for the nodes to observe one of the two cases mentioned previously. Hence, further ideas are necessary. Our idea is to use a threshold T v for each node v that cuts its time into time intervals. If v does not observe a successful message transmission for T v many steps, then p v is decreased. In this way, eventually p will become small. However, because the algorithm is not aware of T , the time window of the adversary, p may be decreased too quickly or too slowly in this way. Hence, we need proper rules for adapting T v over time. It turns out that the following rules work: whenever v senses a successful transmission, T v is decreased by 1, and whenever v does not sense a successful transmission for T v timesteps, T v is increased by 1 for the next time interval considered by v. One may ask why T v should not be decreased as well if an idle channel is sensed, but interestingly this is not a good rule, as will come out in the analysis. Next, we give a formal description of our MAC protocol.
Description of the MAC Protocol
In our MAC protocol, each node v maintains a probability value p v , a threshold T v and a counter c v . The parameter γ is the same for every node and is set to some sufficiently small value in O(1/(log T + log log n)). Thus, we assume that the nodes have some polynomial estimate of T and even rougher estimate of n. Letp be any constant so that 0 <p ≤ 1/24. Initially, every node v sets T v := 1, c v := 1 and p v :=p. (These initial values are not required for a correct execution of our protocol, as we will prove.) Afterward, the protocol works in synchronized timesteps. We assume synchronized timesteps for the analysis, but a nonsynchronized execution of the protocol would also work as long as all nodes operate at roughly the same speed.
In each step, each node v does the following: v decides with probability p v to send a message. If it decides not to send a message, it checks the following two conditions: 
Robustness
Let N = max{T , n}. In this section, we will prove the following theorem. In fact, as we will prove in Theorem 2.16, our protocol can quickly recover from any setting of the (T v , c v , p v )-values: the cumulative probability p t at time t will quickly converge to a relatively high value that yields a good throughput, and the T v values cannot grow infinitely. However, we will first analyze the MAC protocol for well-initialized settings (T v := 1, c v := 1 and p v :=p).
Notice that for n = 1 a node will never experience a timestep with a successful transmission. Hence, it would just keep reducing its access probability in our protocol, thereby reaching a dormant state, which is the best it can do in this case, as there is no one else to communicate with. Thus, it only makes sense to consider the case n ≥ 2.
The proof of Theorem 2.2 will frequently use the following general form of the wellknown Chernoff bounds, which may be of independent interest. They are derived from Chernoff bounds presented in Schmidt et al. [1995] . 
If, on the other hand, it holds that E[ i∈S X i ] ≥ i∈S p i for every set S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, then it holds for any 0 < δ < 1 that
Let V be the set of all nodes. For the proof of the theorem, we will consider all possible decompositions of V into a single node v 0 and U = V \{v 0 }. Let p t (v) be node v's access probability p v at the beginning of the t-th timestep. Furthermore, let p t = v∈U p t (v) (i.e., without node v 0 ) and L = ( 1 log N max{T , 1 γ 2 log 3 N}) be the number of timesteps for which we study the competitiveness of the protocol. If L ≥ N, we will redefine N to N = max{T , n, L} in order to cover long runtimes. If we can prove a constant competitiveness for any such L, Theorem 2.2 follows. We prove the theorem by induction over sufficiently large timeframes. Let I be a timeframe consisting of α log N subframes I of size f = max{T , αβ 2 γ 2 log 3 N}, where α and β are sufficiently large constants. Let F = α log N · f denote the size of I. In order to simplify the calculations, we assume that f and F are integer multiples of T and that T = (1/ ) is above a sufficiently large constant. Moreover, we assume that at the beginning of I,
Our goal is to show that in this case the MAC protocol is constant competitive for I with respect to every subset U = V \{v 0 } and at the end of I,
for every node v with probability at least 1 − 1/N c for any constant c > 0 (which we will also call with high probability or w.h.p. in the following). Since initially T v = 1 and p v =p for every v, this implies that the MAC protocol achieves a constant competitiveness in the first timeframe, w.h.p., and due to the properties on T v and p v , this also holds for polynomially many timeframes, w.h.p.
The proof for timeframe I proceeds as follows. Consider some fixed subset U = V \{v 0 }. A timestep t or subframe I of I with starting time t is called good if p t ≤ 9. Otherwise, it is called bad. First, we show that for any subframe I in which initially
Then we show that for any subframe I with T v ≤ (3/4) √ F for every node v ∈ U at the beginning of I , the subsequent subframe is good with probability at least 1−1/ f c for any constant c > 0 (which we will call with moderate probability or w.m.p.) (Lemma 2.7). Based on the insights gained in the proof, we show that in a good subframe I , all nonjammed timesteps in I are good w.m.p. (Corollary 2.11). After that, we prove that a constant fraction of the timesteps in such a subframe also have probabilities lower bounded by a constant (Lemma 2.12), w.h.p., which implies that the MAC protocol is constant competitive for I w.m.p. (Lemma 2.13). If at the beginning of frame I, T v ≤ √ F/2 for every node v ∈ U , then during the first eighth of I, called J, T v ≤ (3/4) √ F, no matter what happens to the nodes in J. This allows us to show that a constant fraction of the subframes of J are constant competitive w.h.p., which implies that the MAC protocol is constant competitive for J w.h.p. (Lemma 2.14). With that insight we can show that if at the beginning of J, T v ≤ √ F/2 for every node v ∈ U , then this also holds at the end of J w.h.p. (Lemma 2.15). Hence, all eighths of I have a constant competitiveness, w.h.p., which implies that I has a constant competitiveness and at the end of I, T v ≤ √ F/2 for every node v, w.h.p. Applying these results inductively over all timeframes I yields Theorem 2.2.
At the end of this subsection, we also study the recovery properties of our MAC protocol (Theorem 2.16). It turns out that the MAC protocol can get quickly out of any set of (p v , c v , T v )-values, which implies that it also works well if the nodes enter the network at arbitrary times and with arbitrary values instead of starting the protocol at the same time and with the same values, which is not realistic in practice.
LEMMA 2.4. For any subframe I in which initially
PROOF. We start with the following claim about the maximum number of times nodes decrease their probabilities in I due to c v > T v .
CLAIM 2.5. If in subframe I the number of successful message transmissions is at most k, then every node v increases T v at most k + 2 f many times.
PROOF. Only successful message transmissions reduce T v . If there is no successful message transmission within T v many steps, T v is increased. Suppose that k = 0. Then the number of times a node v increases T v is upper bounded by the largest possible so that
so the claim is true for k = 0. At best, each additional successful transmission allows us to reduce all thresholds for v by 1, so we are searching for the maximum so that
. This is upper bounded by k+ 2 f , which proves our claim.
This claim allows us to show the following claim.
CLAIM 2.6. For any interval I with T ≤ |I | ≤ f and |I | being an integer multiple of T in which p
t 0 ∈ [1/( f 2 (1 + γ ) 2 √ |I | ), 1/ f 2
] for the first timestep t 0 in I , there is a timestep t in I with
PROOF. Suppose that there are g nonjammed timesteps in I . Let k 0 be the number of these steps with an idle channel and k 1 be the number of these steps with a successful message transmission. Furthermore, let k 2 be the maximum number of times a node v increases T v in I . If all timesteps t in I satisfy p t < 1/ f 2 , then it must hold that
This is because no v has reached a point with p t (v) =p in this case, which implies that for each timestep t with an idle channel, p t +1 = (1 + γ ) p t . Furthermore, at most log 1+γ (1/ p t 0 ) increases of p t due to an idle channel would be needed to get p t to 1/ f 2 , and then there would have to be a balance between further increases and decreases of p t to avoid the case p t ≥ 1/ f 2 . We know from Claim 2.5 that
is assumed to be above a sufficiently large constant, it holds that 2 |I | + 2|I | ≤ |I |/2. Because g ≥ |I | due to our adversarial model, it follows that we must satisfy
For any timestep t with
To prove bounds on k 0 and k 1 that hold w.h.p., we can use the general Chernoff bounds stated earlier. For any step t, let the binary random variable X t be 1 if and only if the channel is idle at step t or p t > 1/ f 2 . Then,
and because this probability bound holds irrespective of prior steps and is independent of the adversarial jamming decision at time t, it follows for any set S of timesteps prior to some timestep t that
Thus, for any set of timesteps S, it holds that
Together with the fact that g ≥ f ≥ α log N, the Chernoff bounds imply that, w.h.p., either k 0 > 3g/4 (given thatp ≤ 1/24) or we have a timestep t with p t ≥ 1/ f 2 . On the other hand, let the binary random variable Y t be 1 if and only if exactly one message is sent at time t and p t ≤ 1/ f 2 . Then,
and it holds for any set S of timesteps prior to some timestep t that
Thus, the Chernoff bounds imply that k 1 < g/8, w.h.p. (given thatp ≤ 1/24). That, however, would violate the condition that
Note that the choice of g is not oblivious as the adversary may adaptively decide to set g based on the history of events. Hence, we need to sum up the probabilities over all adversarial strategies of selecting g to show that none of them succeeds, but because there are only f many, and for each the claimed property holds w.h.p., the claim follows.
From Claim 2.6, it follows that under the conditions of Lemma 2.4 there is a timestep t in subframe I with p t ≥ 1/ f 2 , w.h.p. Let t be the last of these timesteps. If t belongs to one of the last β log N nonjammed steps in I , then it follows for the probability p t at the end of I that
given that = (1/ log 3 N) as at most β log N decreases of p t can happen due to a successful transmission and at most β log N + 2 f decreases of p t can happen due to exceeding T v .
Otherwise, suppose that t belongs to one of the last T steps in I . Because there must be at least β log N nonjammed steps in the time interval I from t till the end of I (otherwise we are in case 1), we conclude similarly to the proof of Claim 2.6 that for the nonjammed timesteps in I , k 0 ≥ 2k 1 w.h.p., unless there is a timestep t in I with p t ≥ 1/ f 2 , which contradicts the definition of t. Moreover, k 2 ≤ k 1 + √ 2T for I due to Claim 2.5 and the fact that |I | ≤ T . Hence, it follows for the probability p t at the end of I that
w.h.p., unless there is a timestep t in I with p t ≥ 1/ f 2 , which contradicts the definition of t.
Otherwise, t belongs to a timestep before the last T steps in I . Let I be the largest possible time interval starting with t with |I | being an integer multiple of T that ends no later than I . Then it follows from Claim 2.6 that there must be a timestep t in I with p t ≥ 1/ f 2 , w.h.p., contradicting the definition of t. Hence, w.h.p., only one of the first two cases will apply, which finishes the proof of Lemma 2.4. PROOF. We first show that there is a timestep t in I with p t ≤ 6, w.h.p. Let the timesteps in which the adversary does not jam the channel and at most one message is sent by the nodes be called useful. Suppose that there are g useful timesteps in I . Let k 0 be the number of these steps with an idle channel and k 1 be the number of these steps with a successful message transmission. To establish a relationship between k 0 and k 1 , we need the following claims. CLAIM 2.8. If all timesteps t ∈ I satisfy p t > 6, then it holds for any g ≥ δ log N for a sufficiently large constant δ that k 1 ≥ k 0 w.h.p.
PROOF. Let q 0 (t) be the probability of an idle channel and q 1 (t) be the probability of a successful message transmission at a useful step t. If p t > 6, then it follows from Claim 2.1 that the probability of an idle channel (given a useful round) is at most 
because only the sending node does not decrease its probability, and for this node the maximum probability isp. For p t > 6, it follows that p t+1
. From Claim 2.8, we now that after the first δ log N useful steps, there must have been more steps with a successful transmission than with an idle channel for any one of the remaining useful steps w.h.p, which implies that for each of them, p v ≤p/γ for all nodes v. Thus, whenever there is an idle channel for these steps, p t+1 = (1 + γ ) p t . Hence, if we start with p t = 6 after the first δ log N useful steps, then in order to avoid a step t with p t ≤ 6 in I , we must have that k 1 ≤ (5/4)k 0 . Because p t might be as high aspn initially, we can allow at most (5/4) log 1+γ N further events of a successful message transmission without having a step t with p t ≤ 6.
Since log 1+γ N = ω(log N), it holds that δ log N + (5/4) log 1+γ N ≤ 2 log 1+γ N for a sufficiently large N, which implies the claim.
We know from the proof of Claim 2.8 that for any useful step t with p t > 6,
Since random decisions are made independently in each step, our Chernoff bounds imply that k 0 < (4/9)(1 − 2/δ)g w.h.p. if δ is sufficiently large.
Thus, if I contains at least δ log 1+γ N useful steps, we are done. Otherwise, notice that for every node v, it follows from the MAC protocol and the choice of f and F that if initially T v ≤ (3/4) √ F, then T v can be at most √ F during I . Let us cut I into m intervals of size 2 √ F each. It is easy to check that if β in the definition of f is sufficiently large compared to δ, then m ≥ 3δ log 1+γ N. If there are less than δ log 1+γ N useful steps, then at least 2δ log 1+γ N of these intervals do not contain any useful step, which implies that p v is reduced by at least (1+γ ) −1 by each v in each of these intervals. Hence, altogether, every p v gets reduced by a factor of at least (1 + γ ) −2δ log 1+γ N during I . The useful timesteps can only raise that by (1 + γ ) δ log 1+γ N , so altogether we must have p t ≤ 6 at some time point during I w.h.p.
In the following, let t 0 denote any time in I with p t 0 ≤ 6. We finally prove the following claim.
CLAIM 2.10. For any useful timestep t after a step t 0 in I with p t 0 ≤ φ for some φ ≥ 6 and any constant δ > 0, it holds that
PROOF. Suppose that t 0 is the last useful timestep before step t in I with p t 0 ≤ φ. Let g be the number of useful timesteps from t 0 to t. Then g ≥ ln(1 + δ)/ ln(1 + γ ) because otherwise it is not possible that p t ≥ (1 + δ)φ. Recall that for any useful step r with p r ≥ 6, Pr[ p r+1 = (1 + γ ) p r ] ≤ 1/7. If exactly one message is sent at a useful step, then
Let k 0 be the number of useful steps with an idle channel and k 1 be the number of useful steps with a successful message transmission. It must hold that
, so the Chernoff bounds imply that
Hence,
Because we assume that γ = O(1/ log f ), it follows that w.m.p. p t ≤ (1 + δ)6 for any particular timestep t after t 0 , resulting in the lemma with δ = 1/2. Claim 2.10 with φ = 9 and δ = 1/3 implies the following result.
COROLLARY 2.11. For any good subframe I , all nonjammed timesteps t of I satisfy p t ≤ 12 w.m.p.
We also need to show that for a constant fraction of the nonjammed timesteps in a good subframe, p t is also lower bounded by a constant. Recall thatp ≤ 1/24.
LEMMA 2.12. For any subframe I in which initially
p t ≥ 1/( f 2 (1 + γ ) 2 √ f ), at least 1
/8 of the nonjammed steps t satisfy p t ≥p w.h.p.
PROOF. Let G be the set of all nonjammed timesteps in I and S be the set of all steps t in G with p t <p. Let g = |G| and s = |S|. If s ≤ 7g/8, we are done. Hence, consider the case that s ≥ 7g/8.
Suppose that p t must be increased k 0 many times to get from its initial value up to a value ofp and that p t is decreased k 1 many times in S due a successful message transmission. Furthermore, let k 2 be the maximum number of times a node v decreases p v due to c v > T v in the MAC protocol. For S to be feasible (i.e., probabilities can be assigned to each t ∈ S so that p t <p), it must hold for the number of times in S in which the channel is idle that
For the special case that k 0 = k 2 = 0, this follows from the fact that whenever there is a successful message transmission, p t is reduced to p t+1 ≥ (1 + γ ) −1 p t . On the other hand, whenever there is an idle channel, it holds that p t+1 = (1+γ ) p t because of p t <p. Thus, if > k 1 , then one of the steps in S would have to have a probability of at leastp, violating the definition of S. k 0 comes into the formula due to the startup cost of getting to a value ofp, and k 2 comes into the formula because the reductions of the p t (v) 
) is large enough). Then for this to be true, it must hold that PROOF. From Corollary 2.11 and Lemma 2.12, we know that in a good subframe at least 1/8 of the nonjammed timesteps t have a constant probability value p t w.m.p. For these steps, there is a constant probability that a message is successfully sent. Using the Chernoff bounds results in the lemma.
Consider now the first eighth of frame I, called J. 
for some constant c that can be made arbitrarily large. Hence, for any set S ⊆ {1, . . . , k},
Our Chernoff bounds, therefore, imply that at most (α/24 ) log N of the subframes in J are bad, w.h.p, if α is sufficiently large. According to Lemma 2.13, each of the good subframes is constant competitive w.m.p., where the probability bounds are only based on events in the subframes themselves and, therefore, hold irrespective of the other subframes (given that each of them is good). So the Chernoff bounds imply that at most (α/24 ) log N of them do not result in a constant competitiveness of the MAC protocol, w.h.p. The remaining (α/24 ) log N subframes in J achieve constant competitiveness, which implies that the MAC protocol is constant competitive on J, w.h.p.
We finally need the following lemma that bounds T v . The proof of this lemma requires considering all possible decompositions of V into a node v 0 and U = V \{v 0 } so that every node experiences many successful transmissions. PROOF. We know from Lemma 2.14 that for any node v our protocol is constant competitive for V \{v} w.h.p. Hence, every node v notices ( |J|) successful message transmissions in J w.h.p. T v is maximized at the end of J if all of these successful transmissions happen at the beginning of J, which would get T v down to 1. Afterward, T v can raise to a value of at most t for the maximum t with t i=1 i ≤ |J|. Since such a t can be at most 2|J|, it follows that T v can be at most 2F/8 = √ F/2 at the end of J, w.h.p.
Inductively using Lemmas 2.13 and 2.15 on the eighths of frame I implies that our MAC protocol is constant competitive on I and at the end of I, 
PROOF. Suppose that p t
f ) for some timepoint t 0 . Then it follows from the constraints of the adversary and the Chernoff bounds that it takes at most δ/ log 1+γ (1/ p t 0 ) steps for some sufficiently large constant δ to get the system from p t 0 up it follows that altogether at most 2δ log 1+γ (1/ p t 0 ) steps are needed to get the system from p t 0 to a probability p t ≥ 1 f 2 (1+γ ) 2 √ f , w.h.p. (or more precisely, with probability at least 1 − 1/N c ). It remains to bound the time to get T v down to √ F/2 for every v. It holds thatT ≤ √ F/2 if and only if F ≥ 4T 2 . Hence, consider a timeframe I of size F = max{F, 4T 2 } for the old definition of F described earlier, where I starts at the point at which the probabilities p v have recovered to
. Then all the aforementioned proofs go through and imply that I is constant competitive. Moreover, when cutting I into pieces of size |I|/32 instead of |I|/8, the proof of Lemma 2.15 implies that at the end of the first 1/32-piece J of I, T v ≤ √ F /4, w.h.p. Hence, the timeframes of the nodes shrank by a factor of at least 2 in J. Inductively using this bound, it follows that also at the end of I, T v ≤ √ F /4 for all v, w.h.p. This allows us to reduce F by a factor of 2 for the next frame I. Also for this F , we get T v ≤ √ F /4 for all v, w.h.p., so we can keep shrinking I by a factor of 2 until |I| = F for the original F considered in our previously described proofs. Altogether, the recovery toT ≤ √ F/2 for all v takes at most O(T 2 ) time.
Combining the two upper bounds for the recovery time yields the theorem.
Interestingly, we can show that our MAC protocol is also efficient under adversarial attacks in terms of transmitted messages. The first lemma follows directly from our earlier insights. PROOF. First, we determine the expected number of transmissions of a single node v. Let p v (t) be the probability that v transmits a message in round t 0 + t. Due to our MAC protocol, p v (t) decreases by (1 + γ ) −1 at latest for t =T , then another time after T + 1 further steps, another time afterT + 2 further steps, and so on. Hence, the total expected number of transmissions of v for any continuous jamming attack is at most
Summing up over all nodes, we obtain a total of O( p ·T /γ ) transmissions. Because all transmission decisions are done independently at random, the Chernoff bounds imply a total of at most O( p ·T /γ + log N) w.h.p.
In our MAC protocol, beyond f steps after any initial choice of the access probabilities, p = O(log N) w.h.p. This is due to the proof of Lemma 2.7 and the fact that for p ≥ c log N, the probability that an idle channel is experienced is at most 1/N c , so further increasing p has a polynomially small probability. Furthermore,T = O(log 2 N/γ ) w.h.p. for any constant given that all nodes v start with T v = 1. Hence, the total number of transmissions of our MAC protocol under a permanent attack that starts after f steps would be bounded by O(log 3 N/γ 2 ) w.h.p.
AN APPLICATION TO LEADER ELECTION
Robust medium access techniques can constitute an important building block for many robust applications. In this section, we provide an exemplary application to the classic leader election problem where n nodes need to agree on a single leader among them. Concretely, our goal is to design a leader election protocol that is self-stabilizing despite adversarial jamming. Following the usual notation in the self-stabilization literature, the system state is determined by the state of all variables in the system. That is, the protocol and any constants used by the protocol are assumed to be immutable and not part of the system state. A system is called self-stabilizing if and only if (1) when starting from any state, it is guaranteed to eventually reach a legal state (convergence) and (2) given that the system is in a legal state, it is guaranteed to stay in a legal state (closure), provided that there are no faults or membership changes in the system. In our case, roughly speaking, the legal state is the state in which we have exactly one leader.
We will define the set of legal states more formally when we introduce our protocol. Although our protocol is randomized and the leader election has to be performed under adversarial jamming, our protocol is still guaranteed to eventually elect exactly one leader from any initial state.
The SELECT Protocol
Our leader election algorithm (called SELECT for SElf-stabilizing Leader EleCTion) is based on the ideas introduced for the medium access protocol. Again, each node v maintains a parameter p v that describes v's probability of accessing the medium at a given moment of time. The nodes adapt and synchronize their p v values over time in a multiplicative increase multiplicative decrease manner, that is, the value is lowered in times of high interference or increased during times where the channel is idling. However, p v will never exceedp, for some constant 0 <p < 1.
In addition, each node maintains two variables, a threshold variable T v and a counter variable c v . Again, T v is used to estimate the adversary's time window T : a good estimation of T can help the nodes recover from a situation where they experience high interference in the network. In times of high interference, T v will be increased and the sending probability p v will be decreased.
Initially, every node v sets c v := 1 and p v :=p. Note, however, that while we provide some initial values for the variables in our description, our protocol is self-stabilizing and works for any initial variable values, as we will show in our proofs.
SELECT distinguishes between two node roles: follower and leader. We use s v to indicate the role of the node: s v = 1 means that node v is a leader, whereas s v = 0 means v is a follower. The basic idea of our protocol is to divide time into intervals of a small number of rounds specified by the constant parameter b > 5 (we use the variable mc as a modulo counter); in the following, we will refer to a sequence of rounds between two consecutive mc = 0 events as a b-interval. (Of course, it can happen that all b slots of an interval are jammed.)
Our protocol is based on the concept of so-called leader slots, special rounds-in each b-interval through which SELECT cycles-in which leaders are obliged to send an alive message (a so-called leader message) and in which followers keep silent. The idea is that the followers learn that the leader has left in case of an idling medium during a leader slot (of course, the leader slots may be jammed!) and a new election is triggered automatically.
SELECT uses four leader slots: 2 ls 1 , ls 2 , ls 3 , and ls 4 . Of course, in the beginning, all nodes may have different ls values and may disagree on which slots during the binterval are leader slots. However, over time, the nodes synchronize their states and a consistent view emerges. For the synchronization, five temporary variables ls 0 , ls 1 , ls 2 , ls 3 , and ls 4 are used, which store future ls values. Depending on whether the node is of type follower or leader, the leader slots are updated differently: At the beginning of a new b-interval, a leader copies its ls i values to the ls i values. A follower, on the other hand, copies the ls values "diagonally" in the sense that ls i is copied to ls i+1 for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. As we will see, this mechanism ensures that an elected leader covers the leader slot ls 3 of each follower. (SE-LECT guarantees that the adaptive adversary has no knowledge about the ls 3 slots at all until it is already too late to prevent a successful election.) Another special slot besides ls 3 is ls 0 , which is a random seed to mix the execution for increased robustness.
In Figure 1 , we give the detailed formal description of the follower and the leader protocol, respectively. Recall that our algorithms can tolerate any initial values of mc, p v , T v , c v , s v , s v , ls 1 , ls 2 , ls 3 , ls 4 , ls 0 , ls 1 , ls 2 , ls 3 , and ls 4 . For instance, in the beginning, all nodes v may be leaders and for all v, s v = 1. However, the fixed parameters used by the algorithms, namelyp, γ , or b, are assumed to be immutable.
Each node v executes either the follower or the leader algorithm, depending on the value s v . Both the follower and the leader algorithm consist of three main parts. The b-interval wise update (Lines 2-4) makes sure that ls values are refreshed frequently. (In the case of the follower algorithm (Figure 1, left) , if a node v sets s v to 1 in Line 4, the former "follower" v will immediately start running the leader algorithm in Figure 1. ) Lines 6-33 (in case of a follower) and Lines 5-24 (in case of a leader) are used for medium access to synchronize the nodes' states (by a message that includes c v , T v , and p v values). This gives nodes the chance to become or remain leader (by a "LEADER" message).
The last sections of the algorithms are used to react to high interference (by reducing p v ) and to reset leader slots. The reason for checking whether ls 3 is undefined in Line 6 of the follower protocol is to keep the leader slots hidden from the adaptive adversary until it is already too late to prevent a successful leader election. Both the follower and the leader protocol depend on the following crucial CONDITION.
Definition 3.1 (CONDITION). We define CONDITION (Line 37 for followers, and Line 28 for leaders) as the event that at least one LEADER message was received during the past b · T v steps.
The idea is that if CONDITION is fulfilled, we know that the protocol is already in a good state. Moreover, we will see that the adversary cannot prevent CONDITION to become true for a long time, as the T v values would continue to increase.
Finally, also note that leaders increase p v faster (i.e., by larger multiplicative factors) during idle rounds than followers. With this mechanism, SELECT improves the likelihood that a LEADER message gets through and hence that a unique leader is elected.
Analysis
This section shows that the randomized SELECT protocol is guaranteed to eventually reach a situation where there is exactly one leader and n − 1 followers. Concretely, we will derive the following theorem. We make use of the following definitions. First, we define the system state. We use the following LS L set to describe the union of all possible leader slot values present in the system. We use the concept of so-called preleader states, that is, states that result from follower states before some nodes become leaders.
Definition 3.6 (Preleader State). A state S is called a preleader state, denoted by S ∈ PRELEADER, if it is a follower state, and at least one follower node v has s v = 1.
While in the beginning, the leader sets may be large as each node regards different slots during the b-interval as the "leader slots" over time the values synchronize and the LS sets become smaller. This facilitates a fast leader (re-)election. So in a leader state, it holds that any follower's ls 3 and ls 2 slots are covered by either another follower's ls and ls slots, or a leader's ls and ls slots (cf. Condition (iii)).
Finally, it is useful to define safe and legal states.
Definition 3.8 (Safe and Legal State).
A system state S is called safe (denoted by S ∈ SAFE) if S ∈ FOLLOWER or S ∈ LEADER, and legal (denoted by S ∈ LEGAL) if S is safe and there is exactly one node v with s v = 1.
Thus, according to our definitions, any legal state is also a safe state. In the following, let S be the set of all possible system states, SAFE ⊂ S be the set of all safe system states and LEGAL ⊂ SAFE be the set of all legal system states.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 unfolds in a number of lemmas. An interesting property of our randomized algorithm is that it is guaranteed to be correct, in the sense that deterministically exactly one leader is elected; only the runtime is probabilistic (i.e., depends on the random choices made by SELECT).
First, we study leader messages.
LEMMA 3.9. For any network state, it holds that if a leader successfully transmits a "LEADER" message, the system will immediately enter a legal state.
PROOF. When a node (either follower or leader) receives a LEADER message, it sets ls 3 and ls 2 to undefined (Lines 22-25 in Figure 1 , left; after Lines 15-17 of Figure 1 , right), and considers itself a follower. Thus, in the new state, there is exactly one leader (the sender of the LEADER message) and n− 1 followers. The state is also a safe state, namely a leader state: Conditions (i) and (ii) are fulfilled trivially. Condition (iv) also holds, as there is only one leader that has four slots. Condition (iii) is fulfilled because nodes receiving a LEADER message reset their slots ls 3 and ls 2 ; since ls 3 and ls 2 are undefined for a follower, Condition (v) also holds.
We next consider what happens if nodes hear a message sent by a follower. In Case (A), after the follower message has been successfully sent, there are still n followers and no leaders or preleaders. We will show that the system enters the follower state at the beginning of the next b-interval. Let us refer to the follower node that sent the message by v and to any remaining node by w. When w receives the message from v (Lines 26-32 in Figure 1, left) , it sets ls 1 (w) := ls 0 (v), ls 2 (w) := ls 1 (v), ls 3 (w) := ls 2 (v), and ls 4 (w) := ls 3 (v). The c values become the same (c w = c v ), and T w := T v . The new state, therefore, fulfills the follower state conditions: Clearly, Conditions (i), (ii), and (iv) are fulfilled immediately, and Condition (iii) holds as well, as for all followers w that did not send a message and follower v that sent a message, at the beginning of the next b-interval: ls 3 (w) = ls 2 (w) = ls 1 (v) = ls 2 (v), ls 3 (v) = ls 2 (v) = ls 3 (w) = ls 4 (w), and ls 1 (v) = ls 2 (w) = ls 0 (v) = ls 1 (w).
For Case (B), observe that during the remainder of the b-interval the number of preleader nodes with s v = 1 cannot decrease, and hence there will be at least one leader at the beginning of the next b-interval. We now show that the new state will indeed be a leader state as nodes "synchronize" with the follower node that sent the message. Without loss of generality, assume that node u is the last follower that successfully sent a follower message in the current b-interval. Let us refer to the other follower nodes by v 1 and to the leader nodes or the preleader nodes (i.e., the followers v with s v = 1) by v 2 . Again, Conditions (i) and (ii) are fulfilled trivially. As for Condition (iii), we need to consider two subcases: Case 1. No node experienced an idle channel in its ls 3 slot after the message has been successfully sent. If this is the case and follower u is not a preleader, it holds that for follower v 1 : ls 2 (v 1 ) = ls 2 (v 2 ) = ls 1 (u) in the current b-interval, and ls 3 (v 1 ) = ls 2 (v 2 ) = ls 2 (u) at the beginning of the next b-interval; on the other hand, if follower u is a preleader, then in the current b-interval it holds that for follower v 1 : ls 2 (v 1 ) = ls 2 (v 2 ) = ls 1 (u), and ls 3 (v 1 ) = ls 2 (v 2 ) = ls 1 (u) at the beginning of the next b-interval. Hence, Condition (iii) holds. Regarding the cardinality of the leader set LS L , observe that at the beginning of the next b-interval, if u is not a preleader, all leaders will have ls 1 = ls 0 (u), ls 2 = ls 1 (u), ls 3 = ls 2 (u), ls 4 = ls 3 (u), and hence LS L = {ls 0 (u), ls 1 (u), ls 2 (u), ls 3 (u)}; therefore, |LS L | ≤ 5. Otherwise, if u is a preleader, then LS L = {ls 0 (u), ls 1 (u), ls 2 (u), ls 3 (u), ls 4 (u)}; therefore, |LS L | ≤ 5.
Case 2. One or more nodes experienced an idle channel in their ls 3 slots after the message has been successfully sent. In the following, we prove this case correct assuming that u is a follower and not a preleader. If u is a preleader, the proof is analogous.
(1) If v 1 experienced the idle channel at its ls 3 timeslot, and became a preleader:
Note that a node v 1 may experience an idle channel after receiving the message from u and hence become a preleader; however, Condition (iii) is still satisfied, as it holds that for follower u: ls 2 (u) = ls 3 (v 2 ) = ls 3 (v 1 ) in the current b-interval and ls 3 (u) = ls 3 (v 2 ) = ls 3 (v 1 ) at the beginning of the next b-interval. As for the cardinality of the leader set LS L , observe that at the beginning of the next b-interval, all leaders will have ls 1 = ls 0 (u), ls 2 = ls 1 (u), ls 3 = ls 2 (u), ls 4 = ls 3 (u), and hence LS L = {ls 0 (u), ls 1 (u), ls 2 (u), ls 3 (u)}; therefore, |LS L | ≤ 5. (2) If u experienced the idle channel at its ls 3 timeslot and became a preleader: If node u experienced an idle channel after successfully sending the message, u became a preleader, and we have for a follower v 1 , ls 2 (v 1 ) = ls 2 (v 2 ) = ls 1 (u) in the current binterval and ls 3 (v 1 ) = ls 2 (v 2 ) = ls 1 (u) at the beginning of the next b-interval. Hence, Condition (iii) is satisfied. As for |LS L |, observe that at the beginning of the next b-interval, for a leader v 2 , ls 1 = ls 0 (u), ls 2 = ls 1 (u), ls 3 = ls 2 (u), ls 4 = ls 3 (u), while for the remaining leader u, it holds that ls 1 = ls 1 (u), ls 2 = ls 2 (u), ls 3 = ls 3 (u), ls 4 = ls 4 (u). Hence, also in this case, we have that |LS L | ≤ 5. An important property of SELECT is that once it is in a safe state, it will remain so in future (given that there are no external changes). Similar properties can be derived for other states, as we will see.
LEMMA 3.11. Once the system is in a safe state, it will remain in a safe state in the future.
PROOF.
We study what can happen in one round, and show that in each case, the safety properties are maintained. In a round, (A) either a LEADER message is successfully sent, (B) a follower message is successfully sent, (C) there are collisions or the channel is jammed, or (D) there is an idle channel.
In Case (A), the claim directly follows from Lemma 3.9 and from the fact that safe states are a superset of the legal states (SAFE ⊃ LEGAL). In Case (B), the claim follows from Lemma 3.10 and by the fact that the system is in the safe state already.
In Case (C), if the channel is blocked, follower nodes (even those which sent a message in this round) do not change their state except for the synchronized rounds in Lines 35-43, and similarly for the leaders in Lines 26-34. Our protocols guarantee that the leaders have the same c v and T v values as the followers when ls 3 and ls 2 are valid, and since the leaders experience the same number of successful transmissions and idle timesteps as the followers do (single-hop network), the claim follows.
If there is an idle channel (Case (D)), all nodes v for which ls 3 (v) = mc will set s v = 1 in the current b-interval, while other values remain the same. It is clear that from this point on, until the end of the current b-interval, the claim holds. Moreover, as we show next, the claim is still true at the beginning of next b-interval. If ls 3 (v) is undefined, then the claim holds trivially, as no states will change in this case. If ls 3 (v) = mc for any node v and the nodes experience an idle channel, there is no leader because, if there was a leader, according to Condition (iii) of the leader state definition (Definition 3.7), a follower's ls 3 slot would always be covered by a leader slot of a leader, which yields the contradiction. Hence, the current safe state must be a preleader state. Let v denote the followers that have s v = 0 (i.e., they are not preleaders); let u denote the followers with s u = 1 (preleaders). In the current b-interval, we have ls 2 (v) ∈ {ls 0 (u), ls 1 (u), ls 2 (u), ls 3 (u)} ∪ {undefined}, which is true according to Condition (iii) of the follower state definition (Definition 3.5). Then, at the beginning of next b-interval, u will become a leader, and hence we have ls 3 (v) = ls 2 (v), ls 1 (u) = ls 1 (u), ls 2 (u) = ls 2 (u), and ls 3 (u) = ls 3 (u). This implies that ls 3 (v) ∈ {ls 0 (u), ls 1 (u), ls 2 (u), ls 3 (u)}, which satisfies Condition (iii) of the leader state Definition 3.7. Conditions (i) and (ii) are clearly satisfied. Condition (iv) holds simply because we have shown (in Lemma 3.10, jams during I, at least (1 − /3)T − (1 − )T = 2 T /3 nonjammed steps will be idle, which implies that the cumulative probability at the end of I will be by a factor of at least (1 + γ )
T /3 ≥ n 3 higher than at the beginning of I. Using this insight, it follows that eventually a T -interval is reached with p > /4. Once such a T -interval has been reached, it is easy to show that p will not get below 1/n 2 any more w.h.p. so that for every T -interval afterward, there is a time point t with p > /4 w.h.p. So infinitely often the following event can take place with some lower-bounded, positive probability:
Consider two consecutive T -intervals I 1 and I 2 starting at a time when c v = 0 for every node v. Suppose that I 1 just consists of busy steps and I 2 just consists of idle timesteps. Then the adversary has to leave T busy timesteps in I 1 nonjammed and T idle timesteps in I 2 nonjammed. For I 1 , there is a positive probability in this case that exactly three messages from different nodes are successfully sent in three different b-intervals. In this case, all but one follower respect the leader slots (as their ls 3 -value is defined), whereas the follower that sent the last successful message may still send out messages at all timesteps (as its ls 3 -value is still undefined, see Line 6 of the follower protocol). Thus, it is indeed possible that all timesteps in I 1 are busy. Up to that point, the adversary has not learned anything about the leader slots. In I 2 , there is also a positive probability that none of the followers transmits a message throughout I 2 so that all timesteps are idle. As the adversary does not know which of them is a leader slot and has to leave T nonjammed, there is a positive probability that ls 3 is nonjammed, and some of the followers become preleaders and then leaders.
Thus, the expected time to get from a follower to a leader state is finite. (2) Leader state to legal state If there is only one leader in the leader state, the system is already in a legal state by definition. If there is more than one leader, then we distinguish between the following cases. If CONDITION is fulfilled, we know that a LEADER message got through and the system is in a legal state. Otherwise, the leaders will invalidate all of their ls slots once their c v values are reset to 0. At this point, there is a positive probability that for the next T steps a LEADER message is successfully sent. As the adversary has to leave T timesteps nonjammed, at least one LEADER message will be successfully transmitted within these T steps so that the system reaches a legal state. Analogous to the followers in the previous case, one can lower bound the cumulative probability of the leaders (in fact, the leaders will eventually reach a timepoint with a cumulative probability of ( ) as they increase their probabilities in case of an idle channel more aggressively than the followers) so that the chance of successfully transmitting a LEADER message repeats itself infinitely often with a lower-bounded positive probability. Thus, the expected time to get from a leader to a legal state is finite as well.
From these cases, the lemma follows.
CONCLUSION
This article presented the first medium access scheme robust to a wide range of interference types which even include adaptive jamming, together with a rigorous analysis proving an asymptotically optimal, constant competitive throughput. We regard this result as an important step toward a better understanding of more complex protocol or physical models for signal propagation. Moreover, as we have shown for the case of leader election, such a protocol can also serve as a basis for robust applications. Another important direction for future research regards the study of dynamical aspects (e.g., How can a MAC algorithm adapt to join and leave behavior or mobility of the nodes, and which rate is sustainable without losing a constant competitiveness?)
